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A Right to Access to Emergency Health Care:   
The European  Court   of  Human Rights Pushes the Envelope  
 
by Aleydis Nisen *  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article argues that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems to have recently 
acknowledged that there is a right to access to emergency health care in the member states of 
the Council of Europe. The Chamber of the ECtHR found that a state’s failure to design a 
regulatory framework that guarantees access to health care in emergency situations violates the 
substantial limb of Article 2 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that protects the 
right to life. It is argued that the newly established requirements seem to be reasonable but 
that there seem to be no sufﬁcient safeguards to ensure that the ECtHR does not substitute its 
own assessment for that of medical professionals. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The ECtHR seems to have taken a stance on access to emergency health care following 
two recent complaints in which persons died during their treatment in Turkish 
maternity hospitals. The cases of Mehmet S¸entu¨rk and Bekir S¸entu¨rk v. Turkey (2013) and 
Asiye Genc v. Turkey (2015) are set to become leading Strasbourg authorities.1 This 
commentary shall describe the facts and reasoning in the cases before analyzing the 
judgments. This analysis argues that this jurisdictional evolution bolsters the right to 
emergency health care in the contracting states in a reasonable and 
 
 
* PhD researcher, Cardiff University.  
1. Mehmet S¸entu¨rk and Bekir S¸entu¨rk v Turkey (Application no 13423/09) (2013) 60 EHRR 4; Asiye Genc v Turquie 
(Application no 24109/07), Judgment of 27 January 2015. 
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non-discriminatory way, while warning that the ECtHR should be careful not to 
substitute its own assessment for that of medical professionals. 
 
2 FACTS 
In the ﬁrst case, Mehmet S¸entu¨rk had driven his pregnant wife to four hospitals before a 
doctor specialising in gynaecology examined her. Upon arrival in the fourth hospital, a 
team of gynaecologists noticed that the unborn baby had died after 8 and a half 
months in the womb. They also stressed that immediate surgery was necessary to save 
the wife. According to the ﬁrst claimant and a domestic investigation conducted by 
the Turkish Ministry of Health and the Turkish General Medical Council, this hospital 
asked for a deposit to cover the costs of hospital admission and surgery. The claimant 
stressed that this was why his wife had signed a paper declining treatment in this 
hospital. Turkey denied this. Subsequently, an emergency doctor arranged for the 
wife to be transferred to a ﬁfth hospital in a private ambulance in which no medical 
staff was present. She died in the ambulance. 
 
In the second case, the baby of Asiye Genc was prematurely born in a ﬁrst hospital 
which did not have a unit to treat the baby’s respiratory distress. During the domestic 
investigation procedure, the staff of this hospital alleged that they had ensured that 
the baby’s condition was stabilised before they decided to transfer the baby to a 
second hospital with a suitable neonatal unit. The baby was transported in an 
ambulance with an incubator over a distance of 110 km, accompanied by an 
anaesthetist and a nurse from the ﬁrst hospital. On arrival at the second hospital, the 
baby was refused admission because all of the incubators were occupied. The doctor 
responsible at the second hospital claimed to domestic investigators that she had 
examined the baby but the accompanying medical staff of the ﬁrst hospital denied this. 
The baby was also refused admission by a third hospital, again due to a lack of 
available incubators. According to his testimony to the domestic investigators, the 
responsible doctor of the third hospital considered that it was better to leave the baby 
in the ambulance’s incubator to avoid hypothermia. The baby died on the return 
journey to the second hospital. 
 
3 REASONING 
By way of a preliminary remark, it should be pointed out that the ECtHR applied its 
established case law to explain that it could only assert jurisdiction over persons who 
have been born, given the absence of a European consensus on the point at which life 
begins.2 The state parties to the ECHR have a wide margin of appreciation in this 
controversial matter.3 Therefore, only the right to life of the mother was judged in the 
S¸entu¨rk case. The right to life of the born baby was judged in the Genc case. 
 
In both these cases the ECtHR referred to the Powell v. United Kingdom (2000) and 
Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy (2002) cases for two reasons. First, the ECtHR did this to 
explain that the right to health could entail positive obligations under article 2 
 
2. ibid paras [107–109]. 
3. ibid paras [107–108] referring to Vo v France (Application no 53924/00) (2004) 40 EHRR 12 paras [82 
 and 85] and A, B and C v Ireland (Application no 25579/05 (2010) 53 EHRR 13 para [237].   
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ECHR.4 Second, the ECtHR did this to reiterate that matters such as error of judgment 
on the part of a health professional or negligent coordination among health 
professionals in the treatment of a particular patient cannot be sufﬁcient to engage 
the responsibility of the state as long as the contracting state has made adequate 
provision to secure high professional standards among health professionals and to 
protect the lives of patients.5 On this issue, the ECtHR found that the insufﬁcient 
coordination between the involved departments in the hospital where it was 
diagnosed that Ms. Sentu¨rk’s life was in danger was not sufﬁcient to engage Turkey’s 
responsibility.6 Correspondingly, the insufﬁcient coordination between the involved 
hospitals in the Genc case alone was found to be not sufﬁcient to engage Turkey’s 
responsibility.7 In so doing, the ECtHR explained that Turkey’s responsibility could 
not have been engaged if the baby’s death would have been exclusively caused by a 
failure to effectively coordinate his hospitalisation. 
 
The ECtHR further attempted to present its material interpretations in both new cases 
as applications of the material interpretation under Article 2 ECHR that was set out in 
Nitecki v. Poland (2002).8 In the Nitecki case the ECtHR set out that an issue may arise 
in relation to a material aspect of the right to health under Article 2 ECHR where it is 
shown that the authorities of a contracting state deliberately put an individual’s life at 
risk through the denial of health care which they have undertaken to make available the 
population generally.9 In this particular case, the Court found that the applicant was 
not entitled to a full refund for the drug used to treat ALS, because Poland had not 
undertaken to offer a standard of health care this high to the public.10 There is, 
however, a clear difference between the new case law and the Nitecki case. In 
particular, in the Nitecki case the ECtHR held that an issue may arise under the 
material aspect of article 2 ECHR if it is shown that the authorities of a contracting 
state fail to honour their commitments. However, nowhere in the ECtHR’s material 
analysis in the S¸entu¨rk case and the Genc case is there any reference to a provision in 
which the Turkish government commits to provide access to health care in emergency 
situations to its population in general. Rather, the ECtHR adopted a new interpretation 
in these cases. The ECtHR expressed that the material aspect of article 2 ECHR can 
also be violated if a contracting state did not enact a sufﬁcient regulatory framework 
for guaranteeing that the lives of patients are protected in medical 
 
4. European Convention on Human Rights, ETS no 5 (1950), art 2; Mehmet S¸entu¨rk and Bekir S¸entu¨rk v Turkey, 
para [79] referring to Powell v United Kingdom (Application no 45305/99), 30 EHRR 30 and Calvelli and 
Ciglio v Italy (Application no 32967/96), Judgment of 17 January 2002, para [48]; Asiye Genc v Turquie, paras 
[65–66] referring to Powell v United Kingdom and Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy, para [48]. The Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy 
case (2002) concerned the procedural aspect of the right to life under art 2 ECHR, which covers the right of an 
effective investigation. 
5. Mehmet S¸entu¨rk and Bekir S¸entu¨rk v Turkey, para [80] referring to Powell v United Kingdom and Calvelli and Ciglio v 
Italy, para [48]; Asiye Genc v Turkey, para [67] referring to Powell v United Kingdom and Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy, 
para [49]. 
6. Mehmet S¸entu¨rk and Bekir S¸entu¨rk v Turkey, para [80]. 
7. Asiye Genc v Turkey, para [67]. 
8. Mehmet S¸entu¨rk and Bekir S¸entu¨rk v Turkey, para [88] referring to Nitecki v Poland (Application no 65653/ 01), 
Admissibility decision of 21 March 2002; Asiye Genc v Turquie, para [73] referring to Nitecki v Poland. 
9. Nitecki v Poland, para [1]. 
10.  ibid. 
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emergencies. The ECtHR therefore did not require that the contracting state 
undertakes to make health care available to its population but expressed that this 
positive obligation only exists in emergency situations. 
 
To determine whether access to health care was denied in an emergency situation, the 
ECtHR analysed the sequence of events leading to the death of the patients in both  
cases.  In  the  S¸entu¨rk  case,  the  ECtHR  ﬁrstly  argued  that  the  treatment  was 
subordinated to a prior ﬁnancial obligation while the medical staff was aware of the 
urgency of the wife’s situation.11 In addition, relying on evidence from the internal 
investigators, the ECtHR found that it was sufﬁciently proven that the wife’s decision to 
be transported to a ﬁfth hospital was not made in an informed manner or in such a 
way that national bodies could be exonerated from their responsibilities.12 The 
ECtHR concluded that the domestic law of Turkey did not have provisions capable of 
preventing the failure to provide medical treatment in emergency situations when the 
corresponding fees were not paid.13 This seems to this author to be accurate. 
According to a number of circulars from the Turkish Ministry of Health, the reported 
payment practices in Turkish hospitals in emergency situations persisted over a 
prolonged period of time, between 2004 and 2011, after Ms. Sentu¨rk’s death.14 
 
In the Genc case, the ECtHR held that there could not have been an error of judgment by 
the medical staff as the baby died before any examination had taken place. The ECtHR 
considered that Turkey had not enacted a sufﬁcient regulatory framework for 
guaranteeing an efﬁcient public hospital service and health protection system in which 
there was a place for a baby that needed urgent medical treatment.15 The ECtHR found 
that there was a total absence of urgent medical treatment. The ECtHR concluded that 
the baby had been denied access to appropriate emergency treatment, in breach of his 
right to protection of his life, due to a lack of coordination between health care 
professionals coupled with structural deﬁciencies in the regional hospital system.16 
 
Judges Lemmens, Spano and Kjølbro wrote a Separate Opinion in the Genc case.They 
afﬁrmed that a right of access to emergency health care exists in the legal order of the 
Council of Europe.17 They also found a material breach of article 2 ECHR on the right 
to life.18 They did not, however, agree with the majority of the judges that the ECtHR 
has the authority to require a domestic regulatory framework that guarantees access to 
emergency health care. The three judges argued that the material infringement of the 
right to emergency health care hinged entirely on the lack of coordination between 
the medical staff in the hospitals.19 They considered that the observed actions and 
omissions went ‘far beyond a simple error of judgment on the part of a health 
professional or negligent coordination among health professionals in 
 
11. Mehmet S¸entu¨rk and Bekir S¸entu¨rk v Turkey, paras [90–96]. 
12. ibid para [95]. 
13. ibid para [96]. 
14. Sayan v Turkey (Application no 81277/12), Judgment of 11 October 2016, paras [67–73] referring to 
Turkish Ministry of Health, Circular no 2004/47 (30 March 2004) and to Turkish Ministry of Health, Circular 
no 2011/62 (15 December 2011). 
15. Asiye Genc v Turkey, paras [80 and 82]. 
16. ibid paras [77–82]. 
17. Asiye Genc v Turkey, Opinion concordante Lemmens, Spano, and Kjølbro, para [2]. 
18. ibid. 
19. ibid paras [2 and 4]. 
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the treatment of a particular patient’.20 The three judges also found that the majority 
of the judges had overstepped its authority by criticising the functioning of the 
Turkish health system, including the limited number of places for patients and   the 
limited number or quality of incubators.21 They explained that the majority of the 
judges could not require a ‘certain standard, level or quality’ of treatment and 
equipment in hospitals.22 According to this Separate Opinion, such a positive 
obligation would have a too far-reaching impact on the way in which governments of 
contracting parties allocate their resources.23 
 
Judge Kjølbro repeated this separate point of view in a Separate Opinion that he  
submitted  alone  in  the  recent  Aydog˘du  v.  Turkey  case  (2016).24  The  facts  and 
judgment of this case were similar to those of the Genc case. A prematurely born baby in 
need died after a caesarean section as there were no units to treat the baby’s 
respiratory disease in three nearby hospitals in the region. The majority of the judges 
concluded in this case that there had been a material violation of article 2 ECHR 
because there had been no sufﬁcient coordination amongst the medical staff in the 
involved hospitals in combination with the lack of a regulatory framework that could 
guarantee the possibility of access to appropriate emergency care in Turkey.25 
 
4 ANALYSIS 
4.1 A Right to Access to Emergency Health Care 
The recognition of a right to access to emergency health care under the ECHR proved 
to be non-controversial. As indicated above, there was an agreement amongst all 
Chamber judges that such a right exists under article 2 ECHR in the discussed 
cases.26 However, requiring contracting states to take positive steps to guarantee 
access to emergency health care was deemed contentious by judges Lemmens, 
Spano, and Kjølbro in the Genc case. They found that the material infringement of the 
right to emergency health care hinged entirely on the lack of coordination between 
the medical staff in the involved hospitals.27 This section argues that the minority of 
the judges appears to have overlooked two important points. 
 
The ﬁrst point relates to the observation that the three judges did not appear to 
acknowledge that heath care professionals are entitled to a working environment which 
facilitates their professional responsibilities in medical emergencies. In so doing, the 
minority of the judges in the Genc case failed to follow General Comment no. 14 on the 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standards of Health of the United Nations 
 
20. ibid para [2]. 
21. ibid. 
22. ibid para [4]. 
23. ibid. 
24. Aydog˘du v Turkey (Application  no  40448/06), Judgment  of  30  August  2016, Opinion en Partie 
Concordante et en Partie Dissidente Kjølbro, paras [5–6].   
25. Aydog˘du v Turkey (Application no 40448/06), Judgment of 30 August 2016, para [103]. 
26. Mehmet S¸entu¨rk and Bekir S¸entu¨rk v Turkey, para [88]; Asiye Genc v Turkey, paras [77–82]; Asiye Genc v Turkey, 
Opinion concordante Lemmens, Spano, and Kjølbro, para [2].     
27. Asiye Genc v Turkey, Opinion concordante Lemmens, Spano, and Kjølbro, paras [2 and 4]. 
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN CESCR).28 Paragraph 42 of 
this General Comment states that: 
 
While only States are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimately accountable for 
compliance with it, all members of society - individuals, including health professionals, 
families, local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil 
society organizations, as well as the private business sector - have responsibilities  
regarding the realization of the right to health. States parties should therefore provide  
an environment which facilitates the discharge of these responsibilities. 
 
It is unfortunate that the three minority judges did not follow this General Comment in 
the Genc case. The ECtHR has even said on various occasions that it tries to insert itself 
into the work of the United Nations and that relevant rules of international law should be 
taken into account when interpreting the ECHR.29 
 
The second point relates to the minority’s assertion in the Genc case that the majority 
of the judges was seeking to rearrange the contracting state’s budgetary priorities. 
Such an argument seems to be symptomatic of a longstanding criticism that positive 
obligations relating to socio-economic rights under the ECHR would undermine 
fundamental political rights.30 Yet, this argument can be challenged when it comes to 
a right to access to emergency health care. 
 
The careful considerations made by the South African Constitutional Court in the 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2002) elucidate the point of criticism that 
will be put forward here.31 In this case, the South African Ministry of Health failed to 
distribute the medicine Nevirapine that the claimant provided and that could prevent 
the spread of HIV/AIDS from pregnant women to their foetuses and babies. After 
establishing that the prevention of infection with HIV is a situation of emergency 
health care, the South African Constitutional Court challenged the government’s 
resource allocation policies. The Court argued that the government failed to design 
an effective programme that was national in scope for those with this urgent need to 
prevent the spread of this deadly disease.32 The relevant part of the judgment deserves 
to be quoted here at length:  
 
28. UN CESCR, ‘General Comment 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of    Health’ (11 August 
2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4. 
29. Eg Golder v the United Kingdom (Application no 4451/70) (1975) 1 EHRR 524, para [29]; Neulinger v 
Switzerland (Application no 41615/07) (2010) 54 EHRR 31, para [131]. See M Forowicz, The Reception of 
International Law in the European Court of Human Rights (OUP 2010) 258. 
30. L Clements and A Simmons, ‘European Court of Human Rights. Sympathetic Unease’ in M Langford (ed), 
Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (CUP 2008) 410. 
31. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2002) (5) SA 703 (CC); JC Mubangizi and BC Mubangizi, 
‘Poverty, Human Rights Law and Socio-Economic Realities in South Africa’ (2005) 22(2) Development 
Southern Africa 284–85; JA Singh, M Govender and N Reddy, ‘South Africa a Decade after Apartheid: 
Realizing Health through Human Rights’ (2005) XII/3 The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy 
365–66. 
32.  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, paras [23–26] referring to Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom (2001) AS 46 (CC), paras [24, 25 and 38]; J Woods, ‘Emerging Paradigms of Protection for 
“Second-Generation” Human Rights’ (2004–05) 6 Loyale Journal of Public Interest Law 117. 
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The Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, 
namely, to require the State to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to 
subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. Such determinations of 
reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves 
directed at rearranging budgets. In this way, the judicial, legislative and executive 
functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance.33  
 
The South African Constitutional Court added that the alternative to to the applied 
reasonableness standard would mean that those people with ﬁnancial issues would be 
excluded from emergency health care when their life is in danger. 
 
Mutatis mutandis, the ECtHR’s progressive requirement to provide a sufﬁcient legal 
framework which guarantees that there is access to health care for every person in 
mortal danger, can have a budgetary impact. But this impact seems to this author to 
be reasonable, as it is an essential safeguard against excluding ﬁnancially 
disadvantaged people from the protection of their right to life in the most immediate 
peril circumstances. It was indicated above, in the context of the S¸entu¨rk case, that 
ﬁnancial requirements may effectively exclude the poorest in society from access to 
emergency health care when their life is in danger. 
 
It should be acknowledged here that the Treatment Action Campaign judgment was 
delivered in a very different context. In contrast to the ECHR, the Constitution of 
South Africa refers explicitly to socio-economic rights.34 In particular, article 27(3) of 
the South African Constitution—which was proclaimed in the post-Apartheid era 
(1996)—stresses that ‘no one may be refused emergency medical treatment’. 
 
However, the majority of the judges of the ECtHR could protect the same right under 
the ECHR in the Genc case by employing the Court’s well-established ‘living instrument’ 
doctrine.35 According to this doctrine, the ECHR should be interpreted according to 
present-day conditions. Article 14 ECHR read in conjunction with article 2 ECHR could 
protect against the described discrimination which excludes the poorest in society 
from health care when their life is in danger. 
 
Closely connected to this observation is paragraph 3 in the UN CESCR’s General 
Comment no 3 on the Nature of States Parties’ Obligations which indicates that a 
sound legislative foundation may be an indispensable element in health care in order 
to combat discrimination effectively in ﬁelds such as health and the protection of 
children and mothers.36 It is unfortunate that the three minority judges did not follow 
this General Comment in the Genc case. 
 
In summary, this sub-section has demonstrated that the Chamber had a watertight case 
when requiring member states to undertake positive steps to guarantee access to 
emergency health care, contrary to the suggestion that was made by the three minority of 
the judges in the Genc case. The budgetary impact of the applied standard is reasonable.  
 
33. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, para [38]; M Kende, ‘The South African Constitutional Court’s 
Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: a Comparative Perspective’ (2003) 6(137) Chapman Law Review 145. 
34. Constitution 1996 (Republic of South Africa). 
35. Tyrer v United Kingdom, (Application no 5856/72) (1978) 2 EHRR 1, para [31]. 
36. UN CESCR, ‘General Comment 3 on the Nature of States Parties Obligations’ (1 January 1991) UN Doc 
E/1991/23, para [3]. 
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By requiring a sufﬁcient regulatory framework to protect the right to life of everyone in 
emergency situations, the ECtHR effectively guarantees that medical staff are supported 
in their job and that the poorest in society are not excluded from emergency health care. 
 
The Court seems to have conﬁrmed the two presented ﬁndings in the recent Aydog˘du 
case. First, the majority of the judges commented that the medical staff did not have the 
choice not to conduct a caesarean section because they worked in a public hospital 
which is obliged to help all patients without distinguishing between them, regardless of 
a structural lack of capacity.37 It was stressed that it was the task of the Turkish state 
to facilitate the medical staff’s responsibilities by providing sufﬁcient capacity.38 
Second, the majority of the judges commented that the Turkish government did not 
demonstrate how providing a legislative framework would have been an excessive 
burden in terms of the choices that the government had to make regarding its 
priorities and the allocation of its resources.39 
4.2 Speculation on Urgent Nature of Medical Situations? 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, there seems to be another issue in which the ECtHR 
seems to have overstepped its authority. The ﬁnding that there was a material breach of 
the right to life by both the majority and minority of the judges in the Genc case relied 
heavily on a subjective selection and interpretation of inconclusive testimonies in the 
(insufﬁcient) internal proceedings. The ECtHR alleged that no examinations of the 
patient had taken place despite the fact that the doctors of all hospitals asserted that 
they conducted the required examinations in the domestic proceedings.40 
 
The ECtHR had held on various occasions that it is impossible to speculate about the 
facts and the death of respective claimants.41 The judges of the ECtHR can indeed not 
replace the conclusions of medical staff or medical experts in domestic 
proceedings.42 
 
The ECtHR also conﬁrmed these principles in the context of access to urgent health 
care in the Affaire Sayan v Turkey case (2015).43 In this case, the ECtHR explicitly stressed 
that it was not possible to speculate about the urgent character of the facts and the 
death of the claimant. Yet, it is worth dwelling for a moment on the Sayan case 
because the ECtHR did not actually follow this approach. The facts of the Sayan case are 
similar to those in the S¸entu¨rk case. The 9-month pregnant partner of Mr Sayan went 
to the ﬁrst hospital because she suffered from respiratory problems. The hospital and 
Turkey allege that necessary treatment was provided but that costs were requested for 
further treatment. The claimant then took his partner to a second hospital. According to 
an internal investigation by the Ministry of Health, a midwife of the 
 
37. Aydog˘du v Turkey, paras [ 85–87]. 
38. ibid para [87]. 
39. ibid para [103]. 
40. Asiye Genc c Turkey, para [17]. 
41. ibid para [77]. 
42. Glass v United Kingdom (Application No 61827/00) (2004) 39 EHRR 15, para [87]; Tysiac v Poland 
(Application No 5410/03) (2007) 45 EHRR 42, para [119]. 
43. Sayan v Turkey, para [110]. See Lopes de Sousa Fernades v Portugal (Application No 56080/13), Judgment of 15 
December 2015, para [109]. 
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second hospital declared that she was unable to hear the heartbeat of the unborn child 
and that she called a specialist doctor. She added that formal procedures were not 
followed as her colleague midwife informed her that the partner had been sent back to 
the ﬁrst hospital. Back in the ﬁrst hospital, the claimant was required to sign a paper 
in which she guaranteed that the hospital costs would be paid. The partner and the 
unborn baby died during treatment. On the day of these tragic events, the head 
claimant ﬁled domestic civil and criminal complaints. In these complaints, he alleged 
that his partner had to wait for health care when she returned to the ﬁrst hospital 
because he could not pay the hospital costs. 
 
In its conclusion on the merits, the ECtHR said that the life of the partner of Mr Sayan 
was not thought to be in danger and that therefore there was no breach of the right of 
access to emergency health care. This conclusion ignored the testimony of the 
midwife and its own factual conclusion that there was some delay due to a prior 
financial obligation that required the claimant to sign a paper in which he guaranteed 
that the hospital costs would be paid.44 The corresponding statements of specialised 
doctors were also not taken into account by the ECtHR.45 A doctor of the ﬁrst hospital 
alleged that there were difﬁculties due to medical costs and a doctor of the second 
hospital testiﬁed that his employer had neither the team nor the means to provide 
patients health care in two separate investigations. 
 
There are serious risks associated with subjective interpretations of a selection of 
testimonies, as seems to have happened in the Genc and the Sayan cases. The ECtHR 
can ﬁnd a violation under the material limb of article 2 ECHR if no access to health 
care is provided while there is no emergency (and while the contracting state has not 
undertaken to make the contested health care available to its population in general). 
Otherwise, an error of judgment on the part of a health professional might lead to a 
violation of the ECHR. Such interpretations would have far-reaching and undesirable 
consequences. A certain level of medical services with a severe budgetary impact or a 
requirement that no errors of judgment at all take place might be imposed. The 
ECtHR ﬁrmly—and rightly—rejected such extensive and positive obligations with 
considerable budgetary and undesirable consequences under article 2 in the Nitecki 
case.46 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that the Chamber of the ECtHR seems to have recognised 
that there exists a material right to emergency health care under article 2 ECHR on 
the right to life in a reasonable and non-discriminatory way, while warning that the 
ECtHR should be careful not to substitute its own assessment for that of medical 
professionals when determining the emergency character of a medical situation. Two 
ﬁndings have thus been presented. First, it was explained that the ECtHR’s 
acknowledgment of positive obligations regarding access to emergency health care is 
reasonable. Safeguarding an environment that facilitates the responsibilities of health 
professionals is an essential safeguard to protect poor people who face obstacles in 
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their quest for equality. Such obligations do not create an individual entitlement to 
health care but do require domestic governments to grant access to health care to 
everyone, including the most vulnerable people in society in emergency situations. 
Such a requirement might have some impact on the budgets of the domestic 
governments but this impact does not seem to be unreasonable. Second, it was 
argued that the ECtHR should, however, be careful not to substitute its own 
assessment for that of medical staff when determining the emergency character of 
the case or the testimonies in the internal proceedings. It was argued that the ECtHR 
seems to have overstepped its authority in the Genc case by relying heavily on 
inconclusive testimonies from domestic investigation proceedings. Subjective 
assessment of the facts can impose a general level of quality of medical services with 
severe implications on the budgets of domestic governments, which are beyond the 
ECtHR’s judicial authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
